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Abstract: A disturbance or breakdown of the first stage of the monetary 
transmission mechanism tends to be synonymous with high and volatile money 
market risk premia. Such market indicators include violations of the covered 
interest parity (CIP). This was not only evident during the financial crisis of 
2007-08, but already during the Japanese banking crisis in the late 1990s, when 
it became referred to as the ‘Japan Premium’. Despite extraordinary policy 
measures by central banks in recent years, however, deviations from the CIP 
indicate continuing or even elevated stress in the international monetary 
system. This paper examines a string of distinct, but closely interconnected, 
assumptions and perceptions regarding CIP arbitrage. By doing so, it not only 
sheds some fresh light on the recent ‘CIP puzzle’ but also on the era of the Japan 
Premium during the 1990s and its aftermath.  
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Benchmarks and indices are often used to construct, measure and decompose risk premia 
in financial markets. High and volatile money market risk premia are seen as 
symptomatic of a disturbance or breakdown of the first stage of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. This is the process by which central banks attempt to affect 
prices, interest rates, credit and ultimately agents’ behaviour and decision-making in the 
wider economy. An important indicator of stress in the international financial system is 
the covered interest rate parity (CIP) – or, to be precise, a violation of it. This was not 
only evident during the financial crisis of 2007-08, but already during the Japanese 
banking crisis in the late 1990s.   
 
‘A Physical Law in International Finance’ 
 
The CIP is a fundamental equation, which, according to Claudio Borio et al. (2016) 
“verges on a physical law in international finance”. Indeed, the significance of it in 
international economics and finance can hardly be overstated. According to the CIP, 
interest rate differentials between two currencies should be perfectly reflected in the 
foreign exchange (FX) forward market. Otherwise, arbitrage would be possible. For 








$),                  (1) 
 
where 𝑖𝑡
$ is the US interest rate, and 𝑖𝑡
¥ the yen interest rate for maturity t. 𝑆$ ¥⁄  and 𝐹𝑡
$ ¥⁄  
represent the FX spot and forward rates between the currencies respectively.  
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In practice, banks typically quote FX swaps, rather than FX forward prices to each other 
(an FX swap is a combination of an FX spot transaction plus an FX forward transaction 
done simultaneously but in the opposite direction). Consequently, the formula can be 
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where 𝑆𝑊𝑡
$ ¥⁄  represents the FX swap price between US dollars and Japanese yen for 
maturity t. 
 
Textbooks in Economics and Finance treat the CIP from the perspective of covered 
interest arbitrage. As stated by John Hull (2000, 14), “arbitrage involves locking in a profit 
by simultaneously entering into transactions in two or more markets.” In other words, as 
soon as one variable in the equation is out of synch, traders rush to lock in “free money” 
– resulting in an immediate price adjustment of one or several of the variables in the 
equation. This particular kind of arbitrage, it is widely argued, ensured that the deviation 
from the CIP tended to be close to zero until August 2007. However, one major 
exception to this was the Japanese banking crisis, which resulted in the so-called ‘Japan 
Premium’.  
 
The Japanese Banking Crisis and the Japan Premium 
 
The Japanese banking crisis in the 1990s resulted in increasing difficulties for Japanese 
banks to access unsecured funds from other commercial banks – particularly in foreign 
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currencies. Although banks, at the time, were offered ample liquidity in yen from 
domestic sources (notably the Bank of Japan), they needed foreign currency funding as a 
result of large-scale investments made abroad during previous boom years. Since the Bank 
of Japan could not offer US dollar reserves, and the interbank money markets dried up 
for the Japanese banks (being perceived as less creditworthy), they had to turn to the FX 
swap markets. In this way, they could use their yen liquidity to swap them into US dollars, 
which they required. When Japanese banks headed for this last funding avenue, the CIP 
deviations became more substantial, indicating that, for traders holding Japanese yen, 
swapping them to US dollars (or other foreign currencies through dollars) would be 
much more expensive than stated in the Eurodollar market. The Japan Premium 
emerged. 
 
Figure 1 shows the 20-day moving average of the 3-month CIP deviation for Japanese yen 
against US dollars. As per Equation (2) and the market convention, mid-market quotes 
are used for FX spot and 3-month FX swap prices, and 3-month LIBOR (London 
Interbank Offered Rate) as the prevailing interest rates. LIBOR is, since its inception in 
1986, the most widely used benchmark for the short-term interbank money market in 
which large banks state they can borrow from each other. The figure illustrates the 
difficulty of Japanese banks to access funding in US dollars in comparison to their peers 
in other countries during the banking crisis. For instance, a value of 40 indicates that 
Japanese banks needed to pay a premium of 40 basis points (0.40 percent) to borrow US 
dollars via the FX swap markets. 
 
< Figure 1 here > 
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In response to the banking crisis (or put differently: to eliminate the Japan Premium), 
the Japanese government introduced a string of policy measures, including bank capital 
injections and wide-ranging reforms (Kanaya and Woo 2000). With the actions deemed 
successful, the CIP deviation disappeared towards the late 1990s. Then, after occasional 
turbulence, normality was rather quickly restored. The CIP for Japanese yen against US 
dollars, as for other currency pairs, more or less held up until August 2007.  
 
Thus, the CIP deviation during the late 1990s came to play a significant role in the 
shaping of government policy towards the banking sector (Peek and Rosengreen 1999). 
The Japan Premium was directly affected by the financial strength of the borrowing 
Japanese banks. However, it was also influenced by the policy of the Bank of Japan (or 
ultimately the Ministry of Finance) through its ability or desire to act as Lender of Last 
Resort, and also its willingness (and ability) to shield unsecured creditors from losses 
(Spiegel 2001).  
 
The Financial Crisis of 2007-08 and the Return of the CIP Deviation 
 
The financial crisis of 2007-08 led to substantial, lasting and volatile deviations from the 
CIP that had held since 1999. This time, however, the equation was showing that the 
problems in the money markets were not only bank- or country-specific, but also currency-
specific. To be more precise, a ‘Dollar Premium’ indicated that the relative demand for 
US dollar funding rose compared to other currencies.  
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As the international money markets froze, the Federal Reserve, the European Central 
Bank and other central banks reacted fast and subsequently introduced a range of 
extraordinary policy measures. However, domestic liquidity injections, like those of the 
Bank of Japan during the Japanese banking crisis, were not sufficient to dampen demand 
since only the Federal Reserve could provide US dollar reserves. Since the demand was 
particularly severe for banks outside the US, an international response was necessary to 
offer US dollar liquidity - in technical terms to reduce the CIP deviation. The systematic 
failure of the CIP, therefore, led to unprecedented co-ordinated international central 
bank action. The Federal Reserve established reciprocal currency arrangements in the 
form of FX swap lines with a range of central banks, including the Bank of Japan, to 
channel dollars to banks in other jurisdictions (Baba and Packer 2009; McGuire and von 
Peter 2009). The dollar liquidity swap lines were designed to improve liquidity conditions 
in the dollar and foreign financial markets by providing foreign central banks with the 
capacity to deliver US dollar funding to institutions in their jurisdictions during times of 
market stress. The initial response to the FX swap lines was positive in the sense that the 
CIP deviations were reduced reasonably quickly following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers.  
 
The CIP Puzzle 
 
From the perspective of the CIP deviation, the Japanese banking sector was less affected 
by the financial crisis of 2007-08. Indeed, other risk premia and financial market 
indicators suggested that non-Japanese banks found it more difficult to fund themselves 
than their Japanese counterparts in the Japanese market. However, with the Eurozone 
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sovereign debt crisis during the spring of 2010, risk premia started to widen again. Rather 
than disappearing since, the CIP deviation indicates continuing (or even elevated) stress 
in the international, and particularly the Japanese, monetary system.  
 
Figure 2 shows 1-year cross-currency basis swap (CRS) prices for selected currencies 
against the US dollar. The derivative instrument can be viewed as a market price for a 
string of 3-month CIP deviations for a specific maturity. Thus, the market essentially 
provides us with a yield curve, which includes expected future (negative) deviations from 
the CIP. For instance, a value of -40 represents a premium of 40 basis points (0.40 
percent) to borrow US dollars via the CRS market for one year.  
 
< Figure 2 here > 
 
The persistent failure of the CIP since 2007 has received considerable attention from 
academics and policymakers alike. Whereas the consensus seems to have been that the 
deviation during the financial crisis stemmed from US dollar funding gaps by global 
banks, the latter period is puzzling – particularly considering the relative stability in 
international financial markets since the establishment of the central bank FX swap 
network. Different explanations have emerged. Tomoyuki Iida, Takeshi Kimura and Nao 
Sudo (2016) stress the importance of monetary policy divergence and the search for yield 
in a low-interest environment. Victoria Ivashina, David Scharfstein and Jeremy Stein 
(2015), on the other hand, point out the capital needed in exploiting arbitrage 
opportunities in international money markets. Vladyslav Sushko et al. (2016) highlight 
the relevance of balance sheet constraints and point to a combination of FX hedging 
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demand and tighter limits to arbitrage. Alfred Wong, David Leung and Calvin Ng (2016) 
argue that the traditional version of the CIP is inadequate in coping with counterparty 
and liquidity risks between countries that are typical during periods of stress. Thus, the 
emphasis has been put on market frictions causing violations of the CIP in terms of a 
‘rule’ or a ‘law’, rather than the internal mechanisms of the equation itself. Perhaps most 
fundamentally, the equation continues to be treated as if each variable can be bought and 
sold - although this is impossible.  
 
A No-Arbitrage Condition 
 
Arbitrage involves buying, selling, borrowing or lending – and in the case of true CIP 
arbitrage, all of these activities at once. Following a long-standing convention, LIBOR, as 
a proxy for the money market interest rate, is used as the ‘i’ in the CIP-equation. 
However, LIBOR and its equivalent in other jurisdictions (such as EURIBOR and 
TIBOR) are benchmarks and not tradable instruments in themselves. Consequently, 
borrowing or lending at ‘i’ in terms of LIBOR is possible in theory but has never been 
possible in practice (Stenfors and Lindo 2018).  
 
Arbitrage in theory, which is typically treated as a risk-free or nearly risk-free activity, often 
differs from arbitrage in practice (MacKenzie 2003). The difficulty of observing perfect 
and completely risk-free arbitrage opportunities leads Iain Hardie (2004) to state that 
most arbitrage activity is, in fact, similar to other trading and investment activity – in 
other words, a speculative activity involving assets perceived to be mispriced. Such 
strategies aim to exploit differences in ‘similar’, but not the ‘same’, assets (Beunza, Hardie 
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and MacKenzie 2006). Indeed, Dagfinn Rime, Andreas Schrimpf and Olav Syrstad 
(2017) find that the CIP deviations would be considerably smaller if other types of money 
market instruments were used.  
 
Problematically, however, hardly any unsecured borrowing and lending takes place 
between banks for maturities of 3 months or longer (FCA 2017), which ought to serve 
not only as the calculation basis for LIBOR itself but also, fundamentally, as the ‘i’ in the 
CIP. That is not to say that the traditional money market is non-existent. It is still vast. 
However, virtually all activity relates to maturities of less than one week. Thus, the ‘i’ 
(when expressed as LIBOR) in the CIP-formula is not only impossible to trade. The 
variable has also evolved into a hypothetical rate, which is only tradable via similar, but 
not the same, financial instruments.   
 
Instead, FX swaps have largely replaced interbank deposits as a short-term funding vehicle 
for banks. Importantly, FX swaps are considerably less credit risk intense than unsecured 
loans – and have received a more favourable regulatory treatment since the 1988 Basel 
Accord was put in place during the 1990s (Stenfors and Lindo 2018). Whereas other 
money markets were extremely illiquid, completely frozen or not tradable at all, FX swaps 
continued to function as a tradable funding instrument throughout both the Japanese 
banking crisis and the financial crisis of 2007-08. It is therefore not surprising that the 
FX swap market has seen phenomenal growth during the recent decades – with global 
daily turnover increasing from $190 billion in 1989 to $944 billion in 2004 and $2,378 
billion in 2016 (BIS 2005; BIS 2016). 
 
 10 
Indeed, the FX swap market has been considerably more liquid (as evidenced by, for 
instance, implied bid-ask spreads) than the corresponding unsecured money markets 
since well before the financial crisis of 2007-08. Figure 3 depicts indicative bid-ask spreads 
for 3-month FX swaps between US dollars and Japanese yen, as well as the corresponding 
deposit rates. 
 
< Figure 3 here > 
 
Despite this trend, however, FX swaps continue to be explained as being derived from 
interest rate differentials between two countries following the CIP – rather than vice 
versa. 
 
From the analysis above, one might go on to conclude that developments in financial 
markets over the last two decades simply have rendered the CIP as obsolete. After all, 
why pay attention to a theoretical no-arbitrage condition when no arbitrage is possible in 
practice? That would, however, be the wrong approach. As Dick Bryan and Michael 
Rafferty (2014) point out, modern derivatives markets have enabled prices in themselves 
to evolve into tradable instruments. The list of such prices is constantly expanding, 
ranging from derivatives on non-tradable benchmarks and indices (such as LIBOR) to 
measurements conceptualised as ‘prices’ (such as volatility, temperature or inflation) 
(Stenfors and Lindo 2018). The established and relatively liquid CRS market belongs to 
this group, as it permits market participants to protect themselves against, or speculate 
on, future deviations of the CIP. In essence, then, the CIP deviation (or, indeed, the 




The fact that the CIP continues to be treated as if each component can be bought and 
sold (which is impossible), whereas financial markets allow buying and selling as if it were 
possible, is important.  
 
First, the vast notional amounts traded in FX swaps, CRSs and LIBOR-indexed 
derivatives create an illusion of intense activity of buying, selling, borrowing and lending 
– even though no such activity may be taking place (Stenfors and Lindo 2018; Stenfors 
and Susai 2018). Prices which “have stood at particular levels for some time acquire 
thereby some sanction and authority” (Shackle 1972, 227, quoted in Hodgson 1988, 
184). At the same time, social norms and conventions play an essential role in the price 
determination process in money markets, which are rooted in relationships and trust 
(Stenfors 2018). Stickiness and clustering of prices around certain focal points are, 
therefore, natural outcomes of human coordination (Stenfors 2014a). This includes a 
price or value of ‘zero’. Consequently, the long episode between the Japanese banking 
crisis and the 2007-08 financial crisis, when hardly any deviations from the CIP in major 
currencies were observed, should be seen in a different light. Rather than treating it as a 
period of relative stability in interbank money markets underpinned by continuous 
arbitrage activities, it was the absence of deviations that provided the CIP with further 
authority. 
 
Second, the equation may both understate and overstate the actual stress in the domestic 
and international money markets – without necessarily deviating from any kind of 
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‘equilibrium’ achieved via CIP arbitrage activities. Indeed, Tetsuro Hanajiri (1999) 
observed a ‘CIP puzzle’ already two decades ago, when analysing the Japan Premium 
during 1997 and 1998. The author’s findings suggested that the Japan Premium 
appeared to be greater when studying tradable markets (e.g. FX swaps) than non-tradable 
markets (i.e. LIBOR). Takatoshi Ito and Kimie Harada (2004) also pointed out that 
interbank money market benchmarks did not serve as robust indicators of stress in the 
Japanese banking system during the early 2000s. Thus, similarly to what has been 
documented following the recent LIBOR manipulation controversies (Stenfors 2014b), 
the CIP deviation can be misleading and affect subsequent policy measures by central 
banks, governments and regulators aimed at restoring health in the banking system and 
overall financial stability. 
 
The CIP was not originally constructed as a tool for monetary policy and financial 
stability. However, the attention to it during the era of the Japan Premium, and 
subsequent use of it by academics, market participants and policymakers made it into 
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Figure 1: 3-month USD/JPY CIP deviation 12.08.1997 - 13.11.2018 (bps) 
 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculation. Notes: 20-day moving average, USD = US dollar, JPY = 
Japanese yen.  
 
Figure 2: 1-year CRS against US dollars 12.08.1997 - 13.11.2018 (bps) 
 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculation. Notes: 20-day moving average, JPY = Japanese yen, EUR = 
euro, SEK = Swedish krona, NOK = Norwegian krone.  
 
Figure 3: Indicative bid-ask spreads 12.08.1997 - 13.11.2018 (bps) 
 
Sources: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. Notes: 20-day moving average, USD = US dollar, JPY = 
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